The fusion of the European peoples cannot result from the only road we are following. In the limited domains of coal and steel-atomic we seek full delegation of national powers to a supranational organization which will make decisions and be subject to controls that are also supranational. But the rest of the economy remains outside these actions. The Common Market itself is a sector as the general conduct of economic affairs-growth, taxes-remains national. The sentiment that their destiny is shared and their prosperity is shared has not been established between the peoples of Europe by the ECSC and will not be by Euratom. How to do it? It is very difficult to find a form that is satisfactory-indeed politicaland that is accepted by the parliaments and peoples. We must continue to speak of the Common Market and as far as possible to achieve its beginning at least. But we must find the political
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Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives 799 exercise that would be limited to states; the aim was to create a true supranational community in which individual citizens would share a common status and identity. Capturing this spirit, Winston Churchill called for "a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent." 5 In a speech preceding the 1948 Hague Congress, Churchill said, We hope to reach again a Europe . . . [in which] men will be proud to say 'I am a European. ' We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think as much of being a European as of belonging to their native land. . . . [And] wherever they go in this wide domain . . . they will truly feel 'Here I am at home.' 6 The Hague Congress also proposed "a European passport, to supersede national passports and to bear the title 'European' for use by the owner when travelling to other continents." 7 In the words of one of the protagonists (the Prime Minister of Belgium), Europe's political leaders viewed economic integration as an interim step on the way towards a genuine European political community with a common citizenship: "Full well did they measure the opportunity that gives these countries of Europe the sense of a common destiny.
Entry in Diary of Jean Monnet (Aug. 5, 1956) (unpublished) (on file with the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe) (Willem Maas trans.). Grateful thanks to the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe and its Director, Gilles Grin, for allowing me to consult the archives. There is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene, and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and happy as Switzerland is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.
Id. Churchill added that the "structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause." Id.
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importance of the economic transformations they had just decided, but in their minds, those transformations, for all their greatness, were merely accessory to, or, at the very least, the first stage of a yet greater political revolution."
8 Inspired by such thinking, the key rights of EU citizenship-primarily the right to live and the right to work anywhere within the territory of the Member States-can be traced back to the free movement provisions contained in the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, which entered into force in 1952. 9 The difficulties in reaching a common definition of who would qualify for freedom of movement, and the slow ratification of the intergovernmental agreement after it had finally been reached, may help explain the much stronger free movement provisions of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. This expanded the scope of the free movement provisions and granted the European Commission-rather than the Member States, as was the case with the Paris Treaty-the power and the responsibility to propose measures required to bring about free movement of workers.
10
Despite the gradual growth of European rights from the 1950s onward, EU citizenship's legal status was confirmed only in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993.
11 To some extent, this can be seen as a terminological delay. Indeed, Commissioner Davignon argued in 1979 that "the status of 'Community citizen' [was] officially recognized from the moment when the Treaties granted rights to individuals and the opportunity of enforcing them by recourse to a national or Community court."
12
Regardless of when the concept of EU citizenship is deemed to have gained legal validity, its existence and growth is unmistakably part of the more general process of political integration. In the 1957 Treaty of Rome, member states promised to take "common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe" and to work towards an "ever closer union."
13 Over the course of its more than six decades of political development, there has never been agreement in the European Union and its constituent member states about the finalité politique or end goal of integration. Indeed, the aim of an "ever closer union" 8 PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, THE CONTINUING BATTLE: MEMOIRS OF EUROPEAN, 1936 -1966 (Henry Fox trans., 1971 These two quotations encapsulate much of the longstanding debate about reverse discrimination and the proper relationship between EU citizenship and fundamental or human rights. 18 They also illustrate a gradual expansion of the scope of EU law, from a focus on those who move from one Member State to another to a focus on all EU citizens, coupled with a continuing debate about the appropriate extent and magnitude of the fundamental rights protected by Union citizenship.
Free movement is arguably the foundation for all further European rights: "Citizens of one member state who move to another one to take up residence or employment are caught up in the creation of European rights because they are the beneficiaries of free movement, practice it, and push for its expansion." 19 The political development of European rights started with certain categories of workers, then expanded to all workers, to certain categories of non-workers (e.g. retirees, students), and finally perhaps to all citizens. 20 Until recently, though, the benefits of the EU were available only to those who could appeal to EU law by virtue of crossing from one Member State into another and ceased being in what was termed a "purely internal situation." Reverse discrimination-whereby Member States may treat their own nationals worse than nationals of other Member States by invoking a "purely internal situation" in which European law does not apply-has long been a problem within the European Economic Community turned European Union. Yet introducing Union citizenship alters the status of individuals vis-à-vis their governments and implies equality of treatment among citizens. The resulting political dynamics should reduce and ultimately eliminate reverse discrimination.
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Reviewing the evolution of reverse discrimination in EU law shows that the "purely internal situation" is ever more limited and its invocation ever more contentious. In international relations, ensuring the application of fundamental rights is a matter of state sovereignty. The limits placed on reverse discrimination are thus simultaneously the limits of Member State sovereignty in the face of European law, particularly the ability of Member States to deny their nationals the rights enjoyed by other EU citizens. EU citizenship's growth has reinvigorated the longstanding prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, and reverse discrimination becomes a practice that is incompatible with EU citizenship's commitment to equality.
Certainly, the doctrine of direct effect is important for European rights and does alter the relationship between individuals and Member States. But there was always an economic element, or a link to economic activity, in the cases decided by the European Court, so that prior to the formal introduction of Union citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty the status had no legal standing independent of the economic aims of European integration.
21
Elsewhere I have argued that the project of European integration has always been about more than economics; it is also about creating a community of people transcending nation states. 22 This argument-which can be characterized as a concern not only with markets but also with rights-does not deny that such non-economic logic is difficult to find before the 1990s in European law and in the cases decided by the Court of Justice.
23 Rather, the idea is that the project of transcending borders and building a European community of people is driven by a shared political commitment independent of any economic rationale. 24 Advocate General Sharpston's opinion in the Ruiz Zambrano case addresses pointed questions at the persistence of reverse discrimination and sparked significant interest. 25 The case invoked several questions, most notably whether Union citizens enjoy a right of residence in the Member State of nationality irrespective of whether they have previously exercised their European right to move, which traditionally triggered Union law. 26 Sharpston argued that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality should be interpreted as prohibiting reverse discrimination caused by the interaction between the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States and national law 21 
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that entails a violation of a fundamental right protected under EU law, where at least equivalent protection is not available under national law.
27
This argument was grounded on the theory that "transparency and clarity require that one be able to identify with certainty what 'the scope of Union law' means for the purposes of EU fundamental rights protection" and the concomitant idea that, "in the long run, the clearest rule would be one that made the availability of EU fundamental rights protection dependent neither on whether a Treaty provision was directly applicable nor on whether secondary legislation had been enacted, but rather on the existence and scope of a material EU competence." 28 In other words, "provided that the EU had competence (whether exclusive or shared) in a particular area of law, EU fundamental rights should protect the citizen of the EU even if such competence has not yet been exercised." 29 The Advocate General refers to the Treaty's affirmation that the EU "is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights" to argue-and it is noteworthy that here she cites John Locke's Two Treatises of Government-that this:
Treaty guarantee ought not to be made conditional upon the actual exercise of legislative competence. In a European Union founded on fundamental rights and the rule of law, protection should not depend on the legislative initiative of the institutions and the political process. Such contingent protection of rights is the antithesis of the way in which contemporary democracies legitimize the authority of the State.
30
In framing the question of reverse discrimination in terms of its relationship with EU citizenship, this opinion follows a long line of opinions and rulings emphasizing EU citizenship's importance, 31 which the Court of Justice has ruled is "destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States," conferring on them, in the fields covered by Community law, equality under the law, irrespective of their nationality. 32 Note the important qualifier: equality under the law for Union citizens is limited to fields 27 Id. at para. 144. 28 Id. at para. 163 (emphasis in original). 29 Id. at para. 163 (emphasis in original). The Treaty of Rome prohibited any discrimination based on nationality, 33 and as early as the early 1970s the Court was quite clear that any discrimination based on nationality was outlawed "whatever be its nature and extent." 34 The expansive wording of the prohibition on discrimination based on nationality and its expansive interpretation led many commentators to wonder why the Court was reluctant to apply the prohibition to cases of reverse discrimination. 35 Indeed, some early commentators concluded (in retrospect, prematurely) that Community law would ensure that reverse discrimination (in French, des discriminations à rebours) would not affect the free movement of people because the Court of Justice would be careful to ensure that equal treatment and non-discrimination would be followed.
36
Against such optimistic expectations, the Knoors decision made clear that reverse discrimination would be disallowed only in cases where there was a sufficient connection with Community law. 37 The Court ruled that, although the provisions of the Treaty relating to establishment and the provision of services "cannot be applied to situations which are purely internal to a Member State," 38 the Treaty's reference to "nationals of a Member State" who wish to establish themselves in the territory of another Member State:
33 See Treaty of Rome art. 7 ("Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited."). [I]t is striking that the Court has been reluctant until now to apply [the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of nationality] to cases of reverse discrimination to the detriment of the nationals of the Member State concerned. It is unclear how this limitation can be justified both in terms of fairness and of uniform application of Community law, as well as in view of the large wording of EC Article 12. 
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Cannot be interpreted in such a way as to exclude from the benefit of community law a given Member State's own nationals when the latter, owing to the fact that they have lawfully resided on the territory of another Member State and have there acquired a trade qualification which is recognized by the provisions of community law, are, with regard to their state of origin, in a situation which may be assimilated to that of any other persons enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the treaty.
39
However, the ruling continued, "it is not possible to disregard the legitimate interest which a Member State may have in preventing certain of its nationals, by means of facilities created under the treaty, from attempting wrongly to evade the application of their national legislation as regards training for a trade." 40 In this case, Mr. Knoors, a Dutch citizen wanting to establish himself in the Netherlands after having obtained a professional qualification in Belgium, was subject to Community law. But only individuals with sufficient connection to Community law would be able to avail themselves of these rights.
Similarly to the right of establishment, the right to free movement was restricted to cases involving Community law:
The application by an authority or court of a Member State to a worker who is a national of that same state of measures which deprive or restrict the freedom of movement of the person concerned within the territory of that state as a penal measure provided for by national law by reason of acts committed within the territory of that state is a wholly domestic situation which falls outside the scope of the rules contained in the EEC treaty on freedom of movement for workers. 41 And as with the right to establishment and the right to free movement, so too family reunification under Community law was restricted. Member State nationals who had not made use of the right of free movement and were thus in a "purely internal situation" could not rely on Community law to obtain a right of residence for their family members: 39 Id. 40 Id. at para. 25. 41 The Queen v. Vera Ann Saunders, CJEU Case C-175/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1129, summary.
2014]
Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives 807
the Court dismissed the attempt by two Dutch citizens to apply Community law (which extended residence rights to certain family members of a worker who is a national of one member state and employed in another member state) to allow their dependent parents to reside with them, concluding that the "treaty provisions on freedom of movement for workers and the rules adopted to implement them cannot be applied to cases which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by community law."
42
Reverse discrimination was restricted somewhat by the decision that, in cases of dual or plural nationality, an individual could claim the application of Community law against any Member State of nationality. 43 But it remained striking that "court challenges that would anywhere else have been fundamental rights cases were in Europe cases about economic integration." 44 This peculiar situation persisted because the jurisprudence was based not on a commitment to upholding fundamental rights but rather on the aim of establishing a free market. This tension between rights and markets continues, as the divergent decisions in the Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy cases illustrate. 45 The announcement in the Treaty of Maastricht that "Citizenship of the Union is hereby established" 46 altered the situation in which legal cases were decided on the basis of an economic connection to European law. Henceforth, a new legal category was created, the category of citizen of the Union. In light of the introduction of Union citizenship, Advocate General Jacobs argued that the right to equality and non-discrimination "raises the expectation that citizens of the Union will enjoy equality, at least before Community law." [Because] a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member States the same treatment in law as that accorded to the nationals of those Member States who find themselves in the same situation, it would be incompatible with the right of freedom of movement were a citizen, in the Member State of which he is a national, to receive treatment less favorable than he would enjoy if he had not availed himself of the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement.
51
Such cases, while combatting reverse discrimination, continue to be based on the fundamental freedoms (such as freedom of movement) rather than on Union citizenship. The incongruity has led some commentators to advocate eliminating the distinction. [T]he situation that now exists, under which there are different Treaty provisions governing the position of Member State nationals (i.e., the fundamental freedoms provisions, on the one hand, and the citizenship provisions on the other) should no longer be maintained; a vast topic which would appropriately form the basis of another
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Ruiz Zambrano decision prohibited reverse discrimination not only the basis of economic logic (as in the past) but rather on the basis of the fundamental rights attached to Union citizenship.
53
Thus there is a need to delimit the scope of the fundamental rights attached to EU citizenship: EU citizens enjoy such a wide assortment of sources of rights that it is not clear what kinds of cases would not fall under some sort of fundamental right. Relevant for this problem is the discussion by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Centro Europa 7.
54
Poiares Maduro recalls arguments for extending the Court's role in reviewing Member State measures to assess their conformity with fundamental rights, starting with Advocate General Jacobs's view that any national of a Member State who pursues an economic activity in another Member State may, as a matter of Community law, invoke the protection of his fundamental rights. 55 Noting that the Court did not follow this suggestion, Poiares Maduro nevertheless suggests that all now share:
[T]he profound conviction that respect for fundamental rights is intrinsic in the EU legal order and that, without it, common action by and for the peoples of Europe would be unworthy and unfeasible. In that sense, the very existence of the European Union is predicated on respect for fundamental rights. Protection of the 'common code' of fundamental rights accordingly constitutes an existential requirement for the EU legal order.
56
He continues that, while the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to review any national measure in the light of fundamental rights, it does have "jurisdiction to examine whether Member States provide the necessary level of protection in relation to fundamental rights in order to be able adequately to fulfill their other obligations as extensive study and therefore will not be further discussed in this work. 
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 15 No. 05 members of the Union." 57 This type of review, he argues, "flows logically from the nature of the process of European integration. It serves to guarantee that the basic conditions are in place for the proper functioning of the EU legal order and for the effective exercise of many of the rights granted to European citizens."
58 After raising this suggestion, though, Poiares Maduro qualifies it by arguing that:
[O]nly serious and persistent violations which highlight a problem of systemic nature in the protection of fundamental rights in the Member State at issue, would . . . qualify as violations of the rules on free movement, by virtue of the direct threat they would pose to the transnational dimension of European citizenship and to the integrity of the EU legal order.
59
Significant here is the reference to the transnational dimension of Union citizenship; reverse discrimination concerns its non-transnational dimension.
In her McCarthy opinion, Advocate General Kokott challenges Advocate General Sharpston's Ruiz Zambrano opinion:
60 "I am not of the view that Union citizens can derive from Article 21(1) TFEU a right of residence vis-à-vis the Member State of which they are a national even where-as in the case of Mrs. McCarthy-there is no cross-border element." 61 Kokott thus argues that a Union citizen who has always resided in a Member State of which she is a national and has also never exercised her right of free movement guaranteed by EU law does not fall within the scope of EU law and that the right of free movement of Union citizens does not (in her view) alter this. Kokott admits that reverse discrimination exists, because Union citizens who have made use of their right of free movement may rely on more generous EU rules on the right of entry and of residence than nationals of the host Member State who have always resided in its territory. She notes that "Generally this problem is referred to as discrimination against one's own nationals or called reverse discrimination." 62 In her view, however, there is nothing to be done because reverse discrimination falls outside the scope of EU law:
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In accordance with settled case-law, however, EU law provides no means of dealing with this problem. Any difference in treatment between Union citizens as regards the entry and residence of their family members from non-member countries according to whether those Union citizens have previously exercised their right of freedom of movement does not fall within the scope of EU law.
63
Kokott continues: "It is true that in the legal literature consideration is given from time to time to inferring a prohibition on discrimination against one's own nationals from citizenship of the Union." 64 Here she cites Advocate General Sharpston's position, but notes her disagreement: "as the Court has stated on a number of occasions, citizenship of the Union is not intended to extend the scope ratione materiae of EU law to internal situations which have no link with EU law." 65 Kokott admits that this reliance on the distinction between a "purely internal situation" and one subject to EU law may change: "It cannot of course be ruled out that the Court will review its case-law when the occasion arises and be led from then on to derive a prohibition on discrimination against one's own nationals from citizenship of the Union." 66 But, for Kokott, McCarthy does not "provide the right context for detailed examination of the issue of discrimination against one's own nationals" because "a 'static' Union citizen such as Mrs. McCarthy is not discriminated against at all compared with 'mobile' Union citizens."
67 Kokott reasons that a Union citizen in Mrs. McCarthy's position "cannot rely on EU law in order to obtain for him or herself and his or her family members a right of residence in the Member State in which that Union citizen has always lived and of which he or she is a national." 68 Her solution is to appeal to the European Convention on Human Rights:
[T]he United Kingdom might be obliged, by virtue of being a party to the ECHR, to grant Mr. McCarthy a right of residence as the spouse of a British national living in England. This is not, however, a question of EU 63 Id. at para. 40. 64 Id. at para. 41. 65 Id. 66 Id. at para. 52. 67 Id. at para. 53.
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D. EU Citizenship's Political Objectives
Citizenship denotes an intrinsic status and a set of rights that adhere inherently and equally to all citizens. Because governments increasingly approach citizenship as a policy tool that is subject to variation and modification, identifying which individuals are citizens is as important as the question of what the status of citizenship entails. 71 The pluralism of contemporary societies, bounded political communities in which the processes of statebuilding and nation-building have never been perfectly synonymous, increases the instability of citizenship as the demands of creating and operating a functioning state clash 69 Id. at para. 60. 
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Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives 813 with those of maintaining or building a common identity. 72 The result is the constant creation and re-creation of exceptions and partial or contingent citizenships and policy changes such as those now occurring in Europe. 73 In federal states such as the United States and Canada, the introduction of federal rights empowered individuals and redrew the relationship between the central government and subsidiary governments. Citizenship limits the power of Member States to treat their own nationals worse than nationals of other Member States. This does not eliminate the tension between center and unit (or federal and regional; EU and Member State) law but should give extra weight to former over the latter. Thus it is not surprising but rather expected that Union citizenship represents an expansion of the Union citizens' social rights and well-being that sometimes outmatches the social protection offered at the national level. Jurisdictional issues remain, but the growth of Union citizenship means that EU law should grow to encompass any right protected or promoted by shared citizenship.
The details of the various cases concerning reverse discrimination are noteworthy because they exhibit the expansive rights logic that citizenship entails. The expansive logic of shared citizenship helps explain why populist parties in Europe tend to be opposed to EU citizenship and most of what it entails, including free movement rights and the Schengen system doing away with border controls. 74 Comparative federalism is an appropriate lens for examining reverse discrimination, and the political development of federal rights in federal states such as the United States and Canada provides a useful historical parallel with current and future developments in the EU. 75 Perhaps the development of the incorporation doctrine in the United States, a development which Advocate General Sharpston discusses in her Ruiz Zambrano opinion, is difficult to compare because it is historically distant and the focus was not primarily on individuals. 76 The case of Canada, however, provides a parallel which is more contemporary because the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was introduced relatively recently, in 1982, and
